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
Keep the Flag Flying: A Diplomatic Memoir

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**War Time:
An Idea, Its History, Its
Consequences**

Mary L Dudziak

Oxford University Press, 2012



'Time is a construction of the brain,' says the neuroscientist David Eagleman, 'and the brain goes through a lot of trouble to edit and present this story to you of what's going on out there and how fast or slowly it happens. But what your brain's telling you [that] you see is not always what's out there. It's trying to put together the best, most useful story of what's happening out there in the world.'

Mary Dudziak, in her book *War Time*, sets out to answer the question 'What kind of a time is wartime?'. This is not just an academic debate (Dudziak is a legal historian), as governments shape perceptions of war to meet their not always legitimate ends. Like the brain in the quote above, what we are told by politicians is not always what is happening. One of the merits of Dudziak's book is to show just how malleable the concept of 'wartime' is – and particularly so since 9/11, when conventional narratives of peacetime and wartime have been rewritten.

Dudziak's focus is on the American experience of war, but much of her book will resonate strongly in the UK through our shared experiences and particularly the UK government's ready support of the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. While it proved much harder to sell the idea of a 'War on Terror' to the British public, neither the Labour nor coalition

governments have been able to articulate any coherent war strategies for the protracted and costly engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Wartime, in these cases, has largely been exported, so that for many people their experience of wartime is 'largely devolved to encounters between travellers and airport screeners ... wartime had become a policy, rather than a state of existence'. Dudziak warns that this increasing separation of the vast majority from wartime undermines democratic vigilance, allowing too much unregulated power to the government.

*The War on Terror
created a perception
of permanent war*

Dudziak says her aim is to 'illuminate a conundrum' – that while Americans 'imagine wars to be bound in time ... Since 9/11, war has been framed in a boundless way, extending anywhere in the world that the specter of terrorism resides'. She argues that we conventionally think of war as having a beginning and an end – wartime is followed by peacetime. The War on Terror, however, has upended that view as it created a perception of permanent war and the context for what Jane Mayer called 'the dark side'. President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron have announced dates for the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, but no doubt drone strikes will continue in Pakistan and elsewhere, Guantánamo Bay remains open and even the Chilcot Inquiry appears to be competing for a sense of permanence, with no clear date for the report yet declared.

The peculiarly American notion of a War on Terror (US presidents had previously launched 'wars' on cancer and on drugs) is rooted in America's history and culture, particularly the creation of a national security state. Dudziak discusses how the conventional narrative framing America's Second-World-War wartime between Pearl Harbor and the

Japanese surrender misses the fact that the introduction and continuation of war powers were not confined by these dates. She also devotes a chapter to the question 'What kind of war was the Cold War?', a period that included anti-communist repression, the Korean War and the creation of the military industrial complex, which remains enormously powerful today.

In his book about the Pentagon (*House of War*), James Carroll argues that the path to this 'disastrous rise of American power' was laid by the first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, whose obsessions about the communist threat would contribute to a nervous breakdown and probable suicide. Forrestal coined the term 'semiwar' to describe what he believed was the permanent crisis facing the US. Dudziak does not refer to the term, but we can see a long line linking Forrestal's appointment in 1947 to today's temporal confusions.

Dudziak justifies the narrow, US focus of her book as 'a reasonable starting place for a historian of the United States' and suggests that a more global and comparative account would benefit from collaboration with others. A good basis for this would be Michael Howard's *The Invention of Peace*, in which he showed how war had been the norm in European history and that the peace 'invented by the thinkers of the Enlightenment' only became practicable during the past 200 years. America, he added, does not share the European 'visceral aversion to war'; but what of the UK? As Iraq and Afghanistan clearly show, we remain closer to the American camp when it comes to war.

While Dudziak is mostly interested in the legal implications and abuses of wartime, she touches on some of the wider cultural and sociological issues that influence the way we think about time. A more global and comparative account would benefit from exploring these areas further. Current research into the way the brain works and new theories in physics are changing our understanding of how we experience and perceive time. Dudziak notes that different cultures see time differently. Strategy can be undermined by ignoring


or misjudging these differences. When Robert McNamara, the US defense secretary during the Vietnam War, asked the Viet Minh commander General Giap why the North Vietnamese were willing to lose so many in fighting the Americans, Giap replied, 'Didn't you know we have been fighting for our independence for a thousand years? ... We would have fought until the last Vietnamese was dead before we surrendered'. Let us hope we are not witnessing a similar disconnect with Afghanistan and are still capable of re-establishing peacetime. ■

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Behavioural Conflict: Why Understanding People and Their Motivations Will Prove Decisive in Future Conflict

Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham
Military Studies Press, 2011



Change is long overdue – certainly in the world of military strategic communications. It has become axiomatic that information-rich message clusters be launched over horizons at (hostile) populations, both seen and unseen, in the hope of finding sympathetic targets and achieving behavioural change. Well, according to Andrew Mackay, Steve Tatham and their fellow contributors, it can no longer be a question of *if* but *when* we abandon this fallacy, and transform our own behaviour. What is called for, they plead, is a Copernican shift of perspective. The buzz phrase is 'audience-

centric' as opposed to 'audience-focused' engagement. The latter means the audience is out there somewhere – more chimera, or remote concept, than families with their own lives and concerns; whereas audience-centric implies 'we strive to see things from their viewpoint in order to understand how the "right" solution would look to them': marketers would call this consumer-led rather than product-led campaigning. Sounds simple enough; but it is not. For those of us who have worked on the other side of the journalistic fence, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that militaries have never really got the information thing. Despite recent efforts by more enlightened thinkers like the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir David Richards, the traditional resistance in the senior military mindset endures. The world has moved on, meanwhile; and it is a world full of uncertainty and the unexpected.

*The buzz phrase is
'audience-centric', not
'audience-focused',
engagement*

The strength of this book lies in its second half. Not that the first – a sometimes uneven but nevertheless appropriate springboard of communications sociology and social psychology theory – should be glossed over. However, as it moves towards its climax, *Behavioural Conflict* really scores on two counts: one, it is driven by two seasoned practitioners of counter-insurgency, British Army Major General Andrew Mackay and Royal Navy Commander Steve Tatham, who bring invaluable insights from Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan to their conceptual framework; and two, the authors capitalise on a lifetime's reflection in their attempt to shift an understanding of populations in conflict theatres to the centre-stage of public debate. Their book is topped-and-tailed by other contributors, including General Stanley McChrystal, former commander of ISAF, who supports their aim. 'We are tactically and strategically ineffective,' he says,

'when we expect to win populations without trying to understand them.' This prompts the authors to offer three major platforms for addressing this traditional failing in conflict theatres, particularly pertinent to the Information Age. Most significantly, Western militaries need to undergo a radical broadening of their education. Furthermore, those who handle information – namely information, media and psychological operations personnel – should be increased in number and resourced to become more professional, and their command and directing functions must be accorded equal importance within military hierarchies. Finally, only by stepping up organic research capabilities is there any serious hope of meeting the challenge of the 'unknown unknowns' – the unpredictability and uncertainty that characterise tomorrow's (make that today's) stochastic politico-military environment.

Even the early communications scholars at the dawn of the Cold War recognised that getting messages across to foreign populations was nigh impossible. Forget state jamming of the airwaves; on a simple human level what likelihood was there, never mind guarantee, of one human being picking up on what another actually intended to say? Furthermore, how could you measure effect anyway, particularly when crossing language and cultural divides, not to mention political barriers? When governments get involved in speaking to individuals within any population, things only become more, rather than less, clouded. Now imagine the implications of living in today's digital era, with its mobile phones and laptops, of many-to-many, self-generating communications. All of these elements make the picture infinitely more complex than the one-to-many halcyon days of the mid-twentieth century.

So Mackay and Tatham plead for state actors to adopt the techniques and lessons learned that advertising and branding agencies have refined over the last century. To be fair, states have long since become immersed in a market-oriented approach to communications as the corporate world has annexed public-sector thinking. The

real problem is governments do it so badly, and populations by and large do not trust them. Militaries are caught up in that dilemma, never mind the constraints politicians place upon them, determining what they can and cannot say. The authors propose a greater focus on TAA (Target Audience Analysis) and MoE (Measurement of Effectiveness). Part of the answer, they propose, is to scope the target audience, find the 'right campaign', then measure the penetration of the message: it is an evidence-based approach to communications. The way to achieve 'success' as opposed to 'victory' (language more suited to these post-modern times) is by 'nudging, shoving and shaping behaviours', not by relying on tailored messages. Anything short of that is just whistling in the dark. However, even that is not problem-free, as advertising agencies will volunteer.

Mackay and Tatham propose an evidence-based approach to communications

On a stylistic note, the tone of the text is, however, an acquired taste – heavily personalised with repeated references to 'we' and the authors by name – that jars as the narrative veers occasionally between theoretical exposition and the folksy. Yet for most readers this might make it a more accessible and digestible experience. Either way, that should not overshadow a narrative whose heart is in the right place. It is full of useful information, anecdotes, and revealing insights filtering the historical transformation in the character of conflict through the lenses of the Balkans, Lebanon, Gaza and Afghanistan. However, most importantly, it spotlights an argument that demands a wide hearing in policy-making circles. Their ambition, therefore, is only to be lauded – particularly against a backdrop where they confide that 'in the absence of a mechanism with which to embrace complexity, the West, we worry, has retreated to its "home base" – exporting values and beliefs that it does understand

to environments that it does not in the hope that clarity will ensue.' One might question even further the West's true understanding of its values and beliefs, or at least its ability to communicate them to its own populations, regardless of exporting them to more exotic and distant climes. ■


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Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty

Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson

Profile Books, 2012



Acemoglu, a professor of Economics at MIT, and Robinson, a professor of Government at Harvard, argue that economic development is the product of inclusive institutions: pluralist structures involving broad coalitions. Nations fail economically because of extractive institutions, where predation by the elite keeps countries poor. They begin the book with a comparison of Nogales Arizona and Nogales Sonora, almost identical in geography, culture and history: Nogales Arizona was in Mexico until 1853. The part of town on the US side of the fence has a per-capita income three times that of the part of the town with Mexican institutions. This is despite the fact that Nogales Sonora is a relatively rich Mexican town.

Why Nations Fail is an important book, the product of fifteen years

of published research, mainly using mathematical and statistical models. The book presents these results for a wider audience, which should include many readers of this journal. The book comes with great praise from many eminent social scientists, including eight Nobel laureates in Economics. It has been short-listed for the 2012 Financial Times-Goldman Sachs business book of the year, but has also generated great controversy. The authors illustrate the role of institutions with a broad span of examples, ranging from the Neolithic revolution, through the empires of Rome, Venice and the Maya to a variety of current cases, including Botswana, Brazil, Colombia and China.

The conclusion is that what matters is the structure of political and economic institutions

The authors review alternative explanations based on geography, culture and ignorance of the appropriate policies, but conclude that what matters is the structure of political and economic institutions, in particular whether they are extractive or inclusive. Inclusive political institutions provide a centralised state enforcing a rule of law that protects property and other rights, and stop the elite from plundering the nation. Inclusive economic institutions create not just markets, but an open society that permits innovation and the consequent creative destruction that changes the distribution of wealth and power. Inclusive institutions promote innovation and creative destruction that threatens the extractive elite, which is why the Ottoman Empire banned printing and the Austrian Empire banned steam railways.

The authors argue that economic and political institutions tend to match – both extractive or both inclusive – but they have an interesting discussion of what happens when they do not match. Deng Xiaoping did not change Chinese culture or geography after 1978, but he

did change the economic institutions, generating rapid growth. Yet China retained politically extractive communist institutions behind the free markets. The authors argue that such cases are unstable: the creative destruction that results from inclusive economic institutions eventually threatens the interests of the extractive political elite. Inclusive economic institutions, such as free markets, are not in themselves the answer, since markets are prone to monopoly, generating extractive robber barons. This was the case in the US at the beginning of the twentieth century, until the robber barons were restrained by inclusive, trust-busting, populist presidents. It may also be the case now. Robber bankers and increasing inequality within many countries may need to be restrained by inclusive political institutions, in order to promote growth.

Britain plays a large role in the authors' story. They argue that the inclusive political institutions that developed after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 allowed the inclusive economic institutions of the agricultural and industrial revolutions. Their account of British history sometimes sounds like the traditional Whig interpretation of history, though without the Whiggish sense of inevitability. In their story history is not destiny; they emphasise contingency and the interplay of small institutional differences with critical junctures. The Black Death which ended feudalism and serfdom in Western Europe reinforced these institutions in Eastern Europe.

The authors emphasise contingency and the interplay of small institutional differences

Although many elements of their argument are not new, they have assembled the elements in a coherent way, push the arguments to their logical conclusions and spend considerable time examining what may appear to be counter-examples to their theory. They emphasise the dynamics, how virtuous circles can reinforce the development

of inclusive institutions, or how, more commonly, vicious circles make transformation difficult. With extractive institutions the iron law of oligarchy means that revolutions just replace one rapacious elite with another. They also note that societies with inclusive institutions at home, like Britain, France and the US, did promote extractive institutions abroad.

Acemoglu and Robinson have been criticised for being too monocausal, ascribing too much to institutions; geography, culture, ideology and knowledge of good policies must also play a role. It is not always clear from their theoretical discussion exactly what institutions are and how one distinguishes extractive from inclusive institutions, even with hindsight. Since their history is very broad brush, specialist historians, who are naturally sceptical of grand theories, have questioned the details of their explanations and their evidence. It is not always clear from their account where good institutions come from and exactly what the direction of causation is. Some of the implications of their theory challenge widely held beliefs, including the modernisation hypothesis: that growing income causes a falling share of agriculture, a demographic transition and the growth of democracy. Their statistical analysis suggests a reverse causation: institutions drive all these transitions. This is an argument that will run in technical journals for years.

People who want predictions or prescriptions will not be satisfied with this book. As the authors make clear, small differences, contingency and the role of critical junctures are all important, thus the predictive power of their theory is limited. In addition, one cannot engineer prosperity by specifying the right policies. Without supportive institutions, which create the appropriate incentives and constraints, the right policies will not be implemented, a lesson familiar to many ministers of defence. ■


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All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals

David Scheffer

Princeton University Press, 2011



The atrocities of the 1990s in *inter alia* Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Kosovo seemed to mock all the hopes that had existed in 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down and the Soviet Empire – and then in 1991 the Soviet Union itself – imploded. The only potentially positive factor that these atrocities generated was a move to end legal ‘impunity’ – the notion that while the occasional small-scale thug might be subject to prosecution, the politicians and generals who order atrocity crimes are effectively untouchable, protected by the very status that makes them particularly culpable. To combat immunity, International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) were established by the UN Security Council, along with special courts for Sierra Leone and Cambodia, and, with greater long-term significance, in 1998 the Rome Statute was passed, which led to the establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002.

Atrocities in the 1990s generated a move to end legal ‘impunity’

These tribunals are not without their critics. The ICTY and, especially, the ICTR have taken an inordinate amount of time to prosecute a very small number of individuals; the ICC is quicker on the draw when it comes to issuing indictments, but too quick say some – not least because

ending impunity can also sometimes mean ending the opportunity for a political compromise to resolve a long-running conflict; the global interest in punishing crimes against humanity can sometimes clash with the local interest in stopping the killing, whatever the price. Still, the establishment of these tribunals, and especially of the ICC, has been a game-changer in many respects, and not simply for those miscreants contemplating the commission of war crimes – soldiers in generally law-abiding militaries such as that of the UK now realise that their conduct must satisfy international standards as well as Queen’s Regulations.

America played a large part in bringing about this change, and the author of this excellent memoir was a key player in the relevant parts of the US administration throughout the 1990s. David Scheffer served first as an aide to Madeleine Albright, US ambassador to the UN in the first Clinton administration, and then as US ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues from 1997 to 2001. In *All the Missing Souls*, he has provided us with an invaluable guide to the diplomacy of the period. One might have expected this account to be dominated by the clash between those Western countries which wished to hold figures such as Slobodan Milosevic responsible for their actions, and Russia and China which, for their own reasons, defended traditional notions of sovereign immunity. Not so; in fact, the picture that emerges is one of clashes between America and its allies – who wished to go slower with the ICTY, but faster and further with the ICC than the US desired – and, more interestingly, of clashes within the US administration itself. The Departments of State and Defense squabbled continually; State itself was divided; the White House could only rarely be brought to the point of making a decision; and the US Congress was more or less uniformly unhelpful. Scheffer offers an extraordinary and at times disturbing insight into the making of foreign policy in the US, combining an authoritative and comprehensive survey with some fascinating anecdotes.

Particularly compelling is Part II of *All the Missing Souls*, on the disastrous US campaign to get the kind of ICC

it wanted at Rome in 1998. Scheffer was sent to Rome with an impossible negotiating brief which was the product of a White House decision arrived at after a confrontation in the Map Room between himself on behalf of State and his equivalent from Defense, bizarrely refereed by the First Lady, Hillary Clinton. To add to Scheffer’s misery, as the negotiations in Rome began, Senator Jesse Helms, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, announced that whatever was agreed in Rome would be ‘dead on arrival’ in the Senate. Unsurprisingly, the Rome Statute only marginally reflected American positions, and to this day the US remains outside of this most important and innovative institution.

As will already be apparent, David Scheffer is no apologist for American ‘exceptionalism’ and has nothing but contempt for the kind of nativism expressed by Senator Helms or, somewhat more intelligently, by John Bolton, George W Bush’s sometime UN ambassador, now a Fox News pundit and, worryingly, an occasional adviser to Mitt Romney. Still, there are moments when Scheffer’s assumptions about the centrality of American policy, and the legitimacy of America’s dominant role in the world, might cause eyebrows to be raised. For just one example of a US-centric attitude, his account of the Special Court for Sierra Leone reads strangely from a British perspective; Britain certainly features in this account, but largely in the context of causing problems – at no point does Scheffer acknowledge that without British intervention in May 2000 the issue would have been moot. As to the legitimacy issue, consider this summary *mea culpa* for the US role in the Yugoslav tragedy: ‘Too many thousands of Bosnian and Croatian civilians perished before President Clinton used the power of his office to compel a peace settlement and a military intervention to stop the fighting’ (p. 412). One can only sympathise with the general sentiment, but exactly what is the ‘office’ that entitles a US president to compel a peace settlement in a foreign country? Again, in the context of the role of the Yugoslav Tribunal and the Kosovo crisis of 1998–99, he remarks: ‘[t]he

Tribunal was a potent judicial tool, and I had enough support from President Clinton ... and other top officials in Washington to wield it like a battering ram in the execution of US and NATO policy' (p. 252). This is a sentence that, I fear, will be quoted *ad nauseam* by America's enemies and, indeed, by all those who suspect that international tribunals are little more than instruments of the powerful.

Scheffer provides a unique insight into the international legislative process

Still, none of this should be taken to detract from the value and importance of this book, if only because Scheffer's obvious and total commitment to the need for justice for the victims of atrocity demands of us that we forgive the occasional tendency to view the world through American lenses – in any event, by comparison with what was to come in the George W Bush era, the sins of the Clinton administration pale into insignificance. David Scheffer has provided us with a unique insight into the international legislative process and into the making of US foreign policy. We are in his debt. ■


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**Friends in Need:
Towards a Swedish Strategy
of Solidarity with her
Neighbours**

Edited by Bo Hugemark

Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences,
2012



In today's pigsty of European defence we have three types of little pigs. First, the cautious and diligent, who are both members of NATO and strive to maintain a serious military capability. Second, the diligent gamblers, who are not members of NATO but try to maintain a serious military capability nevertheless. Third, the negligent gamblers, who both neglect their military and remain outside NATO. If Britain belongs to the first category, and Finland to the second, Sweden has slipped into the third category. *Friends in Need: Towards a Swedish Strategy of Solidarity with her Neighbours*, edited by Colonel Bo Hugemark under the auspices of the Royal Swedish Academy of Military Sciences, presents the informed grunts of those little piggies in Sweden who are worried about this situation.

The book, grouping some of Sweden's top security experts, is as politically incorrect as it is important. It is a stark and timely reminder of what may await us as the European liberal dream – a 'European House' with a 'common European security architecture' in which wars between major states were unthinkable – nears its end.

Three trends are undermining the euphoria of the early 1990s. The first is the return of an alienated Russia as a significant regional actor. The strains between the increasingly overt power-politics of the Putin dictatorship and liberal Europe are becoming ever harder to ignore. Combined with the traditional

Westphalian zero-sum worldview of the Putin regime, and its growing domestic problems, the potential for conflicts of interest and confrontations with parts of the liberal West is increasing.

The book is as politically incorrect as it is important

The second trend is the relative rise of Russian hard power in Europe. The Kremlin is now complementing its existing means of influence – energy supplies and corruption – with the first systematic programme to revive Russia's conventional military strength. Even keeping in mind the gap between Russian rhetoric and reality, this will significantly increase Russia's psychological and operational military clout in Europe in the coming decade, especially when combined with its constantly modernising – and unmatched – theatre nuclear capability in Europe.

The third trend is the decline of liberal Europe. We now face – at best – a decade of economic, social, political and military decline. This may reinforce the pooling of European military resources in marginal areas, but the odds are that on all issues of substance the divergent policies of the major European states will be reinforced, preventing any serious security political cohesion beyond the outdated platitudes of the 'European Security Strategy'. None of this need matter if Europe's only real military backbone, the United States, were to remain militarily present in Europe. However, the US is pulling out of European defence and shifting its military focus to Asia.

With Russia coming in, Europe going down and the US pulling out, the 'European House' is beginning to creak, especially for those living next to Russia. *Friends in Need* examines the darker implications head on. The authors include both active and retired military and civilian experts, and represent the cream of the Swedish security and defence analysts that are still able to think in terms of hard military power politics. Yet in this book, that cream curdles. Their

focus on hard analysis free of political correctness is the small politician's nightmare and the serious reader's gist.

The chapters systematically cover the key trends shaping northern Europe's emerging military security environment, including the historical background, Russian policy and military capability, the US presence in Europe, the EU as a security-political actor, the Arctic, Finland and the Baltic states, and, of course, various aspects of Sweden's defence and security political development. The only missing parts of the Nordic-Baltic puzzle are Denmark, Norway, Germany and Poland. Here one senses the relative insularity of the Swedish security analysts, being outside the NATO community.

Driving much of the book is an unstated undercurrent of outrage over three issues. The first is the decline of Sweden's armed forces in the last two decades. Despite retaining one of northern Europe's largest defence budgets, Sweden today arguably has the weakest military capability. The drastic and costly dismantling of Sweden's massive Cold War national defence system may have been justified in part, but what is perplexing is how little Sweden has been able to replace it with. Sweden's operational ground forces today number fewer than 10,000, almost entirely committed to stabilisation operations, supported by a Home Guard of 41,000 for purely national tasks.

This leads to many problems, the first of which is defence. The ground forces are now so small that despite their enhanced flexibility, quality and readiness, large parts of Sweden are today undefended. Some of these, like the island of Gotland, are also exposed. Some question whether Sweden could even defend its international airport, as one top Swedish defence expert noted in *Dagens Nyheter*, the main Swedish daily, in July.

The second problem is military-political and regional. Even if no one expects a direct attack on Sweden in the foreseeable future (and how often have we heard that one?) the possibility of Nordic regional crises, involving Russian threat or use of military force, is growing. Despite significantly expanded defence co-operation among Sweden, Finland

and Norway in particular, Sweden today has a very limited military capability with which to safeguard its regional interests or contribute significantly to any regional military crisis management.

A third problem is diplomatic in form. Staking all military cards on stabilisation operations leaves Sweden with little military-diplomatic clout after the retreat from Afghanistan in 2014. While there will be no shortage of marginal stabilisation operations after that, they will offer very little political dividend. The heyday of grand stabilisation operations and state-building has reached its end, and after Afghanistan the seat at the NATO table, and the access to the US that this provided, will be gone.

The second latent focus of outrage in the book is Sweden's unilateral declaration of solidarity with its Nordic and Baltic neighbours in the event that they face serious security challenges, including political-military ones. While not many outside Sweden have given this much attention, some inside Sweden have asked what this declaration actually means, given Sweden's limited military strength and its 'military non-alignment' outside NATO. One of the book's most controversial, but also most important, chapters examines the implications of Sweden's solidarity declaration in the event of a serious military crisis between Russia and the Baltic states. The scenarios systematically demonstrate that the only way Sweden could provide any significant assistance would be in conjunction with NATO forces, including NATO forces operating from Swedish soil.

The third undercurrent of outrage is precisely Sweden's inability or unwillingness to join NATO. Even if US direct military engagement in NATO is declining, the political and military link to the United States that NATO membership provides remains a strong deterrent in any crisis. With a weak national defence and regional military crisis-management capability on the one hand, and no NATO membership on the other, Sweden is taking a severe risk in the coming decade should northern Europe's security environment decline and Russian military pressure resurface. In this case, Sweden, far from being able to offer


solidarity, might need to get some solidarity itself. ■

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Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm

George J Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham
Cambridge University Press, 2012



In *Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior*, Gilboy and Heginbotham deliver a thoroughly researched and compelling comparison of Chinese and Indian strategic behaviour, and also provide another 'way ahead for US policy' approach. While they express the often-called-for need for US pre-eminence in Asia, in contrast to analysis such as Aaron Friedberg's *A Contest for Supremacy* (W W Norton & Company, 2012) they offer a stark criticism of American support for India's geopolitical ambitions on the grounds of 'democratic partnership' and the inflated perception of Chinese threat. However, the authors' argument that what is instead needed is a re-adjustment of US policy that avoids a destabilising arms race in Asia, and also rebuilds some element of trust with Beijing, rests on some contentious assumptions.

The aim of the first seven chapters is twofold. First, the authors intend to show that China's international conduct is far from being uniquely malicious. Secondly, Gilboy and Heginbotham reveal the at-times quarrelsome conduct of Indian foreign policy through a comparative

analysis with Chinese behaviour. Both countries' strategic cultures are based on *realpolitik*. Their UN voting records on WMD proliferation and dealing with 'rogue regimes' are broadly similar (with China, in some cases, more aligned with the US). The authors also show that China and India have equal records on the use of force and the resolutions of border disputes (again, Beijing has been in sum even more benign on the latter), while Delhi's and Beijing's economic assertiveness in currency and energy policy are broadly similar.

While the authors concede that China has deliberately opaque defence spending, an increasingly confident military doctrine, and is engaged in a vast military modernisation, they convincingly show that India's own military modernisation is, in various fields, more ambitious. Moreover, the ability to launch decisive offensive action and pre-emption has become the *sine qua non* for India's military operational guidelines.

Unwavering US support for India is unjustified, the book argues, for several reasons. Indian endorsements of Iranian ambition are strengthening a geopolitical rival. Moreover, by providing India with geostrategic support and offensive arms with the intention of containing China, US policies have the potential to undermine crisis stability between Delhi and Islamabad. In particular, Gilboy and Heginbotham take issue with the US-Indian civil nuclear agreement of 2008. The deal enabled India to accelerate its nuclear programme, but consequently pushes Pakistan (and possibly China) into a nuclear build-up to match Delhi's strategic deterrent. Moreover, the authors highlight Indian discussions about increasing the range of its nuclear delivery systems to essentially deter Washington from any future intervention in the Asian subcontinent, should future alliances change. In addition, the authors say, India fiercely rejects the notion that it can serve as a hedge against China.

Whilst on the one hand Delhi's regional hegemonic aims are persistently highlighted and its role as a reliable US ally questioned, on the other hand Beijing's global ambitions are

downplayed. In contrast to the alarmists who see China inevitably clashing with the US, the authors highlight China's domestic challenges that decisively weaken its power projection beyond the immediate neighbourhood.

While these comparative analyses of Chinese and Indian behaviour are clear and compelling, the final chapters on US policy failures and the vision for a new *realpolitik* lack clarity.

As US foreign policy-makers' assumption of the 'democratic peace theory' (that democracies tend not to fight each other) justifies the US-Indian alliance and containment of China, the authors argue, Washington turns a blind eye towards Indian policies that are diametrically opposed to US aims. Yet democratic peace theory has always been a dubious explanation of US foreign policy. Although Gilboy and Heginbotham anticipate this objection, their argument – that the theory shapes US behaviour, even if employed as a mere cover for a veiled *realpolitik*; and that, more generally, US policy does indeed show a continuous pattern of democracy promotion – remains only partly convincing. It obscures other fundamental drivers of US foreign policy, such as economics and geopolitics. The assertion that democratic peace theory is a self-fulfilling prophecy and eventually influences the White House neglects the fact that US administrations (in particular that of George W Bush) have seen the rise of India from a clear *realpolitik* perspective. Moreover, with regard to Beijing, one could argue that the US strategy from the mid-1990s has instead been defined by economic engagement and geostrategic containment. While the 'democratisation' of China has loomed large, it has rarely been reflected in broader US policy towards Beijing. So in boosting their argument about a faulty US approach, the authors inflate the impact of Fukuyama on US foreign policy and neglect the existing influences of Kissinger and Huntington.

The notion that US policy is primarily guided by the democratic peace theory, rather than rational interests, relates to an equally contentious assumption: that the US clumsily neglects India's assertive behaviour and its harmful

impact on US interests. But could it be that Washington is perfectly aware of the effects of India's conduct, rather than somehow being trapped in an alliance with India? For instance, there is no reason to believe that the US did not know about Iranian-Indian ties *prior* to the US-Indian rapprochement of the late 1990s. Nevertheless, the US favoured the containment of China. The continuous changes in US policy on Pakistan (including Reagan's 'blind eye' on Islamabad's nuclear programme) throughout the past thirty years are another case in point. History has seen many examples of inconvenient alliances to contain a greater threat. The US has so far shown little interest in abstaining from global aims – such as the containment of the Soviet Union and China – to mitigate relatively minor regional conflicts such as the one between Pakistan and India.

History has seen many examples of inconvenient alliances to contain a greater threat

The authors' final recommendations on US foreign policy promote a 'nuanced realism' that seeks closer Sino-US co-operation in areas such as crisis stability and WMD proliferation. They would de-emphasise criticism of Chinese currency policy and human rights. However, the question of whether these recommendations could ease Chinese suspicions in light of the proposed US 'pivot to Asia' remains debatable. Co-operation in various fields has been possible in the past. Yet the vast US military presence in Asia and the Taiwan issue have at the same time remained *the* stumbling blocks to a more trusting relationship.

Equally contestable is the suggestion to build broader interests with India on the basis of cultural ties, bilateral trade and counter-terrorism, as well as climate policies. The authors' aim is to diversify US-Indian relations to make them more robust and enduring. But it is uncertain if such co-operation can seriously replace

geostrategic calculations as the main driver of the US-Indian rapprochement.

These criticisms aside, *Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior* does offer a useful analysis of a complex three-way relationship. First, Gilboy and Heginbotham's scepticism of statistics is refreshing. In particular, their thorough research of military spending in India and China shows that the usual analysis of military modernisation has to be treated cautiously. Although they are not the first to acknowledge that China is often incorrectly identified as particularly assertive and unco-operative, it remains a valuable contribution against unjustified Sinophobia. Secondly, the comparative analysis of various Chinese and Indian doctrines and policies puts their foreign policy into context. It would be desirable to have similar comparisons of, say, Iran and Saudi Arabia's international behaviour. Most of all, the value of this book is that it successfully invites second thoughts about the premises of the US's Asian and Indian strategies.


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Mugabe's War Machine: Saving or Savaging Zimbabwe

Paul Moorcraft

Pen and Sword Military, 2011



The author of this timely and closely argued work belongs to that small but select band of scholar-journalists who combine the skills of reportage

with impressive intellectual grasp of the complex issues they are despatched to cover by news-hungry editors. For some forty years, Paul Moorcraft has moved effortlessly from a variety of academic appointments to freelance commentary, whether in Zimbabwe's civil liberation war in the 1970s or on the dusty plains of Afghanistan during the rebellion against Russian occupation.

Over the years he has earned a reputation as an accomplished expert on the history of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and the present offering provides a fine analysis of the country's past and present with some pivotal insights into its future. *Mugabe's War Machine* opens with a portrait of Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's president since independence in 1980. The account is peppered with some perceptive quotations about this complex man, gathered by some perceptive observers, most notably one by Richard Dowden, the Director of the Royal African Society: 'Mugabe has not gone mad. Nor was he always bad. He is a complicated schizophrenic man. Driven by the respect for the Western mentality for logic and order and a passionate sense of injustice and rejection by whites'.

There follows a detailed account of the country's history, including a fascinating analysis of the eighteen-year war of liberation and the role played by external actors, including South Africa. The Lancaster House agreement (December 1979) and the transition to independence (April 1980) is handled with skill and appropriate detachment, followed by an account of the civil war between the armed wings of ZANU-PF and ZIPRA, the rival political parties led by Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo respectively.

There is also a graphic account of the ethnic cleansing campaign directed at Mugabe's political opposition, conducted by the infamous 5th Brigade, trained by some hundred North Korean instructors. Subsequent chapters deal perceptively with Zimbabwe's 'wars' in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, together with South Africa's destabilisation campaign involving military attacks on African National Congress (ANC) bases in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana. Moorcraft also

provides a sound analysis of the sustained campaign against the country's white farming community, which precipitated a major crisis in the country's relations with the West, and Britain in particular.

The author also charts the long, drawn-out creation of a Government of National Unity (GNU), which involved a coalition between Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and ZANU-PF. This is at best a fragile enterprise and Moorcraft rightly draws attention to the shadowy but nonetheless formidable role of the military in his penultimate chapter, and in particular the potential influence on the complexion of whatever administration succeeds Mugabe when he finally leaves office – either voluntarily or via forced removal.

Moorcraft's concluding chapter provides *inter alia* a highly relevant and instructive case study for students of intervention as a technique of crisis management. This is a hotly contested topic in the theory and practice of contemporary international relations, and Moorcraft skilfully outlines the difficulties which attend such intervention in Zimbabwe and elsewhere.

The Zimbabwean crisis has had to be managed, however crudely

Certainly, no government or external agency considered military intervention as a serious possibility. The Zimbabwean crisis has, therefore, had to be managed, however crudely and – to some observers – lamely. What, however, may be claimed with some justification is that the crisis never imploded into widespread violence (an essential condition for successful crisis management, old and new); indeed, one might go further and argue that a policy of conflict prevention began with the acceptance by South African President Thabo Mbeki in April 2007 of a South African Development Community (SADC) invitation to mediate between the rival factions in Zimbabwe. True, it operated in fits and starts; true, Pretoria could have been more robust in adopting a more critical diplomatic posture, and at

the very least, threatening, for example, to cut off energy supplies. Nevertheless, a GNU, however precarious, emerged from his efforts and those of his SADC colleagues. That the mediation enterprise lasted so long must be ascribed more to Mbeki's prevarication and unwillingness to play the role of a dominant and forceful hegemon manipulating carrots and sticks (soft versus hard diplomacy) than to the sheer intractability of the crisis.

Finally, with respect to the West's attitude, one might argue that firmer action involving significant intervention is only taken when there is clear and present danger emanating from the threat; for example – current or potential – transnational terrorism. As Moorcraft rightly argues, Zimbabwe, unlike Iraq (allegedly) and Afghanistan, is certainly not a nursery for budding terrorists. Nor does the country harbour weapons of mass destruction of value to the would-be terrorist. This is not to deny that Western states – such as Britain and the United States – have economic interests in Zimbabwe, but they are not of a significant magnitude to warrant intervention against the regime. True, smart sanctions such as travel bans on Zimbabwe's political elite, for instance, were imposed by the European Union, but they have had no noticeable or positive effect. (Indeed, the UK government for one has recently pressed for easing their burden – a nice example of hard power turning into soft power on the grounds that some progress in resolving this long crisis has been made.)

It is fair to say that the crisis has ranked relatively low on the international agenda and pales into relative insignificance given the salience of other more immediate threats to national interest – the global economic crisis and the absorption of governments in that particular crisis. This analysis suggests that Tony Blair's emphasis in his 1999 Chicago speech on the national interest supporting a doctrine of intervention as a crucial determinant of what action could be undertaken against those regimes which abuse human rights was no mere afterthought in the litany of what conditions had to be met to justify such action.

Finally, Moorcraft suggests correctly that the reconstruction of Zimbabwe once Mugabe has gone in political and economic terms will be long and hard. There still remains a reservoir of the necessary human skills – much depleted by emigration in the last decade – but perhaps there is the possibility of a return of at least some of the members of the Zimbabwean diaspora scattered across the world. Certainly, Moorcraft has written an invaluable study of a complex subject and it will be of considerable value to students of Zimbabwe in particular, but also those concerned with policy-making. ■


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The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir

Seyed Hossein Mousavian

Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2012



'The Ahmadinejad administration [has] managed to increase Iran's uranium enrichment abilities and present the world with a nuclear program that has reached the point of no return.' In his memoirs, Seyed Hossein Mousavian provides a Western audience with unprecedented insight into the high-level diplomatic processes that have brought Iran and its interlocutors to the present juncture. Now a visiting scholar at Princeton University, Mousavian was spokesman for the nuclear negotiating team under reformist President Mohammad Khatami in 2003–05. He was

swiftly removed from this role following the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who in 2007 laid charges of espionage against him, of which he was later acquitted.

The Iranian Nuclear Crisis describes two eras in Iranian nuclear diplomacy: the pragmatic (and, in Mousavian's eyes, occasionally too-flexible) diplomacy of the negotiating team under President Khatami; and the ideological, unbalanced approach of the team under President Ahmadinejad, by which time the author was largely an outsider to negotiations. As its primary aim, the Khatami negotiating team sought to prevent Iran's case from being referred by the IAEA to the UN Security Council. Though they succeeded in delaying Security Council action until shortly after the election of Ahmadinejad in 2006, Mousavian highlights several factors he believes hindered their efforts.

First, during Mousavian's tenure as negotiator, Iran's main interlocutor (the EU3 of France, Germany and the UK) was being continually influenced by the United States to take a harder line on Iran. In particular, he claims that initiatives by Iran and the IAEA to come to a peaceful settlement were 'scuttled by the Washington-London axis' and the intervention of Western intelligence agencies.

Threaded throughout the entire book, in fact, is Mousavian's distinct view that the source of the crisis can at most times be traced back not to Tehran, but to Washington. This is true even after the entrance of his memoir's second antagonist, Ahmadinejad. It is hard to swallow Mousavian's overt and unnuanced deflection of blame. By vilifying the actions of the United States, Israel receives barely a mention. Unlike the animated descriptions of Iranian intent expounded by some politicians in Israel and the West, the Iran in Mousavian's book is not a country hell-bent on using its nuclear programme to undermine the security of Israel.

Secondly, Mousavian explains to his audience that from an Iranian standpoint, timing is everything. The Supreme Leader would not accept any deal that fails to provide a long-term framework for a 'way out' of the Iranian nuclear crisis.

Iran has repeatedly felt betrayed in its agreements with the West. For instance, Trita Parsi highlights how Washington labelled Tehran part of the 'Axis of Evil' even after it had provided remarkable co-operation on Afghanistan, stated it was willing to accept intrusive monitoring of its nuclear programme, and to end support for Hamas and Hizbullah.

In contrast to the long-term road map demanded by Tehran, the EU3 made clear that they expected good behaviour from Iran, primarily in the form of enrichment suspension, before laying out additional reciprocal measures. This discord persists today.

Thirdly, from Mousavian's point of view, Washington illegitimately pushed the EU3 to shift from viewing enrichment suspension as something voluntary to instead being a legal requirement – now solidified in multiple UN Security Council resolutions backed by both Russia and China. Mousavian is firm that enrichment is, contrary to the US position, Iran's legitimate right under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Truly, the book highlights his opinion that enrichment suspension is the pivotal issue at the heart of every high-level attempt to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis.

Iran's interlocutors might disagree that the foremost issue is enrichment *per se*. Rather, they are concerned that Iran is not prepared to verifiably demonstrate to the IAEA that it has given up a nuclear-weapons programme. Should confidence be built in this respect, then enrichment would likely become palatable to the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany) at a later stage.

In Mousavian's opinion, enrichment suspension is the pivotal issue

Compounding Western doubt about Iran's willingness to forego a nuclear-weapons option is the secondary role that Mousavian and other Iranian politicians attribute to 'need' – whether

medical isotopes or power generation – in justifying the shape or size of Iran's nuclear programme. Rather, throughout the book Mousavian emphasises legitimate rights, technological progress and promotion of national pride. The current Iranian negotiating team reflected a similar set of priorities at the most recent P5+1 talks in Moscow: the first point of the delegation's presentation declared 'Iran's right to develop peaceful nuclear activities'.

Unlike analyses of the Iranian nuclear crisis by authors outside of the Iranian government, *The Iranian Nuclear Crisis* offers an insight into the architects of the nuclear programme. Mousavian confirms that the Supreme Leader has the final say in all nuclear matters – an assumption in most of the contemporary academic literature. He recounts his experience in negotiating the 2004 Paris Agreement, when he was left 'shocked, stranded, and stumped' by the Ayatollah's unexpected rejection of the negotiating team's policy preferences.

Mousavian's tale is also one of an ill-informed negotiating team. At several junctures he and his team were left to 'respond to questions' by the IAEA, EU3 or the very attentive Iranian population 'about new issues such as P-2 centrifuges and experiments with polonium-210 that we were hearing about for the first time'. Despite a myriad of uncertainties, when the EU3 or P5+1 sit down at the negotiating table across from an Iranian, they can be sure of one thing: they are not negotiating with a team thoroughly informed about their country's own nuclear activities.

Perhaps this explains the glaring absence in this book of any meaningful consideration of allegations over 'possible military dimensions' of the Iranian nuclear programme. It is these suspicions that underlie the international community's concerns.

One cannot help but feel that this omission, too, is rather Iranian. From Mousavian's standpoint, the 'possible military dimensions' issue is just that – one issue. More deserving of attention is the fact that his team and the successor negotiating group have cleared up many more technical ambiguities surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme with the

IAEA. Iranian co-operation should be measured quantitatively, not qualitatively.

Unfortunately for his attempts to convince the reader of the benign nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and Tehran's negotiating strategy, Mousavian only sporadically uses the luxury of hindsight. Thanks to recent IAEA reports, it is now clear that since 2003 the IAEA and its Board of Governors have been aware of worrying, 'credible' intelligence surrounding 'possible military dimensions' to the Iranian nuclear programme. Frustratingly, Mousavian does not overlay these allegations onto his account of the Khatami negotiating era. This lacuna creates the impression that he might in fact think Iran has a weak case in substantiating the purely peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

Regardless of what one thinks of the real reasons for Iran's nuclear programme, or the correct international response, Mousavian's memoirs are essential reading. *The Iranian Nuclear Crisis* speaks to the difficulty of negotiating in 2012. Divisions between Iran and the P5+1 over enrichment, sanctions relief, and the timeline of an agreement exacerbate the challenges of striking a deal with ill-informed negotiators.

Mousavian's proposition for detangling this web is far more complex than most other suggestions that have been put forward: a nuclear deal with the P5+1 should focus on select short-term 'confidence-building' enrichment limits, as well as a multilateral fuel consortium to manage Iranian fuel-cycle activities, and internationally provided fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor. Moreover, the US and Iran must strike a bilateral 'grand bargain' that looks beyond the nuclear realm to broader normalisation of relations. A WMD-free zone in the Middle East must also be realised. Finally, the conditions the P5+1 insist of Iran must be applied to all others – including India, Pakistan and Israel.


For the sake of a peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue, one cannot help but hope that in this regard Mousavian is mistaken. ■

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Keep the Flag Flying: A Diplomatic Memoir

Alan Munro
Gilgamesh, 2012



This refreshingly down-to-earth and often funny volume of memoirs manages the rare feat of also being very insightful. It does not set out to be a *tour d'horizon* of British Middle Eastern policy in the manner of those of Reader Bullard, Alec Kirkbride or Bernard Burrows. Rather, it pricks pomposity whilst giving excellent insight into how the British Foreign Office approached the Middle East and Africa from the early post-Suez environment through to Sir Alan's retirement in 1993. Alan Munro had a very distinguished career in the UK's foreign service, largely spent in the Arab world or dealing with it and Africa from London. These memoirs are as a result mostly focused on the Middle East, but will also undoubtedly appeal to those with a general interest in the practice of British foreign policy.

Some of the anecdotes almost take this otherwise respectable account into the warts-and-all style of more recent retirees from the diplomatic service whose memoirs have been so frowned upon by senior officialdom of late. Some of his stories are in fact so incredible as to almost be unbelievable. What Sir Alan does not do, however, is set out to embarrass those still very much in the land of the living – at least not unless they are British and deserve it, like David Owen (foreign secretary, 1977–79) and Margaret Thatcher, about whom quite a bit is revealed, and not much of it flattering. Among those from the land of the departed are priceless observations about meeting the (subsequently deposed) ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Shakhbut, and the relaying of wry comments by the then-Algerian leader, Chadli Ben Jadid.

Unsurprisingly, perhaps, for a man of Munro's generation and experience, the British decision in 1968 to pull out from the Gulf still rankles. That moment in Britain's Middle East history stands in marked contrast to the events of which he was also a close observer in 1961 when British troops – who had never actually been present in Kuwait – 'returned' there within weeks of the emirate's independence. The insights into the military and diplomatic aspects of that small corrective to the post-imperial shaming five years earlier in Egypt are striking. However, if this reviewer has to quibble (riskily, given Munro's enormous experience), then one would question how much of an Iraqi threat to Kuwait Britain was actually facing down at that time. Some readers might also wonder at his assertion that the so-called pullout decision seven years later was a Labour government cost-cutting exercise, rather than in fact reflecting what had been a gradual post-Suez draw-down and, for some Cabinet members, an ideological bias. He notes that a decade later some Labour ministers failed to see the value of the small Gulf States, most of whom had emerged into independence precisely because of the British withdrawal. Sir Alan writes, however, that the small Gulf States were reassured about the UK's commitment to their security at the time of their independence in 1971 (when the Conservatives were in power). Yet this understanding was arguably already there in the arrangements reached under Labour in 1968, and implicit in 1975 when, mindful of the UK's needs for a recycling of petrodollars, James Callaghan became the first serving British foreign secretary to visit the Gulf.

Sir Alan contrasts the post-Suez phase, private understandings aside, with the fully fledged involvement of British troops in the 1991 Gulf War with which he was intimately involved. He writes strikingly of the US-UK military build-up in Saudi Arabia as 'taking his breath away' after the light-touch, post-imperial assumptions he had been working under. This though, as he rightly points out, was a military intervention with UN Security Council and regional support against an Iraq that had snuffed out Kuwait. A tighter edit would have removed his

understatement, twice in quick succession, of it as an act of 'piracy' (as it would elsewhere a few lines of untranslated French). However Sir Alan's first-hand description of these serious events is totally absorbing. While in different ways he has written about them in two previous books, the up-close and personal nature of this narrative remains fascinating.

Alan Munro had been part of the limited UK government response to a 'something must be done' mentality when he served in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Africa Department in the mid-1970s; even farcically so in the case of Dr Owen's interjection in the Congo, when a foreign secretary travelling by train around the UK seeks to manage by telephone a relief operation by British troops that, ultimately, arrives too late. In the 1990–91 Gulf crisis, however, Sir Alan was to play an active diplomatic role in the beginnings of what arguably has been a continuum of military-backed British diplomacy in the Middle East, and to a lesser extent Africa, ever since. He argues that the foreign secretary at the time, Douglas Hurd, was the last of those who maintained Foreign Office autonomy from No 10 (Margaret Thatcher notwithstanding). Ten years after Sir Alan's departure, the expertise of serving Foreign Office Arabists was sadly rather disregarded by No 10 when the next phase of British military action against Iraq was undertaken.

Perhaps Sir Alan is one of the last of a breed. A sharp, experienced mind combined with modesty and an acerbic wit. His distinct voice comes through these pages loud and clear, and it is this that makes this book such a warm and engaging read. ■

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